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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintif!-Respondent,

Case No.

vs.
WILLIAM COLEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

11722
1

BRIEF OF HESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, William Coleman, was charged with
assault with intent to commit murder in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-30-1<1 (1953). The appellant appeals from
his conviction of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon
vdth intent to do bodily harm in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-7-6 (1953).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was found guilty after a jury trial of
the crime of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
do bodily harm. The jury returned its verdict on April 18,
1969. The trial was presided over by the Honorable Edward Sheya, Judge, Second Judicial District Court, in and
for Weber County, State of Utah, who sentenced the appel-
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lant on the 8th day of .May, 1969, to a term not to exceed
five years in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the conviction of the appellant should be affirmed and asks this Court to hold that
the trial court did not commit reversible error.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with the statement of facts as
set out in the appellant's brief on page. 3. It should be emphasized, however, that the appellant was charged with
assault with intent to commit murder but was convicted
of a lesser included offense, to-wit: assault with a deadly
weapon with intent to do bodily harm.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR BY INSTRUCTING THE
JURY TO DISREGARD THE OPINIONS OF
THE WITNESSES AND THE DEFENDANT.
The respondent agrees with the appellant that the
origin of jury Instruction No. 5 (R. 17) is found in the
discussion between the trial court and counsel concerning
a letter sent by the complaining witness, Linda Martin, to
the appellant subsequent to the shooting and prior to the
trial. The letter in question states what is obviously the

oprnion of the complaining witness, i.e., that she felt the

\\'a::; <m accident. The trial court correctly ruled
that
Martin's opinion as to what happened on the
11 i,ri1t in question \Vas immaterial and wonld not be par"'
ti<.:nlal"ly helpful to the jury. It is clear that neither an
expc1t nor a non-expert witness is permitted to state the
!eg;.,tl result or effect of a particular transaction. State v.
Jf'[c0nitt. i88 l'.(ont. G<ti, :307 P. 2d G83 (1960). The instructio11 as it pertains to this particular complaining witness
was, then, not error. The only other opinion testimony presented at the trial was that of Newell G. Knight (T. 235),
a11d Ro,;coe E. Grover ( T. 249).
The appellant's brief makes it clear that he is claiming
enor on the ground that Instruction No. 5 is so broad that
it exdudes from jury consideration the expert opinion testimony of Mr. Knight and Mr. Grover. Newell Knight testi:ied as an expert on the physiological effects of alcohol,
and Roscoe Grover testified as an expert on firearms (T.
235; 249). Both were calleu as defense witnesses. The testimony of Mr. Grover was mere speculation because the gun
actually used by the defendant was not shown to be faulty.
There was no showing that this witness had examined the
gun used by the defendant, and the trial judge correctly
pointed out that this witness testified only as to possibilities ( T. 252). Even if the jury did disregard this testimony,
the appellant would not be prejudiced thereby. This is
especially true in light of the overwhelming testimony connecting the appellant to the crime. This Court cannot reverse for mere technicalities which do not affect the sub-
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stantial rights of the parties, Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1
(1953).

The testimony of Mr. Knight concerned the effect of
alcohol on the human body. His testimony was based on a
formula whereby the size of the man and the amount of
alcohol over a certain period of time are calculated (T.
He testified that Mr. Coleman would probably have
been impaired to some degree, but he was not sure just
how much. The appellant cannot claim that the jury disregarded Mr. Knight's testimony. The appellant was
charged with intent to commit murder which carries a five
to life penalty. The jury convicted the appellant of the
lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon
with intent to do bodily harm. The lesser offense imposes
a penalty of not more than five years in the Utah State
Prison. Evidently, the jury did not disregard Mr. Knight's
testimony. Moreover, the judge instructed the jury on the
effects of alcohol.
"Our law provides that 'no act committed by
a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication
is less criminal by reason of his having been in such
condition.' This means that such a condition, if
shown by the evidence to have existed in the defendant at the time when allegedly he committed the
crime charged, is not of itself a defense. It may
throw light on the occurrence and aid you in determining what took place; but when a person in
a state of intoxication, voluntarily produced in himself, commits a crime, the law does not permit him
to use his own vice as a shelter against the normal,
legal consequences of his conduct.
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However, when the existence of any particular
motive, purpose or intent is a necessary element to
constitute a particular kind or degree of crime, the
jury, in determining whether or not such motive,
purpose or intent existed in the mind of the accused,
must take into consideration the evidence offered to
prove that the accused was intoxicated at the time
when the crime allegedly was committed.
This fact requires an inquiry into the state of
mind under which the defendant committed the act
charged, if he did commit it. In pursuing that inquiry, it is proper to consider whether he was intoxicated at the time of the alleged offense. The
weight to be gi'ven the evidence on tha,t question and
the S'ignificance to attach to it, in relation to all the
othe1' evidence, are exclusively ivithin your province"
(R. 17, Instruction No. 7). (Emphasis added.)
This instruction shows that the judge's intention was
not to instruct the jury to disregard the opinions of all the
witnesses. In any event, Instruction No. 5 did not constitute error in light of all the facts and circumstances presented in this brief.
In this case, a reading of the entire record shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was properly
convicted. Not only is there no reasonable doubt, there is
no doubt at all. Several witnesses saw the appellant shoot
the victim, Linda Martin. In fact, the defense counsel stipulated that the appellant fired the gun which injured Miss

in Sia,'.c v. l'aldez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 4:1'.2 P. :2d
(1967), the court stated that once a fair trial has been
afforded the appellant, and a verdict supported by the eridence has been rendered, ·' ... the proceedings are
to be valid; and V>'e ai·e not di.sposed to reverse for mere
technicalities or inegulal'ities unless they put the defendant at some snbslantial rl.isadvantage or had some material
bearing on the fairness of the proceedings or its outcome."
Id. at 429, 434 P. 2d at G5. (Emphasis added.)
Utah Code Ann. § 77-4?.-1 (1953) is in accord:
"After hearing an appeal, the court must give
judgment without regard to errors or defects which
do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
If error has been committed, it shall not be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The court must
be satisfied that it has that effect before it is warranted in reversing the judgment."
The appellant has failed to sho-w any substantial prejudice and therefore the presumption of validity must stand.
The appellant was given a fair trial, and the jury rendered
a guilty verdict supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Notwithstanding Instruction No. 5, the appellant cannot
claim prejudice because the jury returned a verdict of a
lesser included offense. There is no other alternative but
to conclude that this verdict was based upon the opinion
testimony of Mr. Newell Knight. The jury did take into
consideration his opinion on the effects of alcohol on the
appellant.
The Supreme Court has ruled that an error committed
by the trial court does not constitute automatic reversal.
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Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967); Harrington
v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).

"A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not
a perfect one." Lutwak v. United States, 344 U. S.
604 (1953).
The substantial rights of the appellant were not aff ectecl in this case.
POINT II.
THE APPELLANT \VAS GIVEN A FAIR
TRIAL AND WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS on EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW AT
ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
The appellant filed a pro se brief to this court in addition to the brief filed by his attorney. The respondent
wishes to answer these arguments briefly.
The appellant first claims that he was deprived of a
separate hearing on the issue of sanity. The record makes
it clear that the appellant was given a continuance so that
he could obtain the services of a psychiatrist (R. 8). The
appellant thereafter entered a plea of not guilty by reason
of temporary insanity (R. 10). He was taken from the
Weber County jail and transported to the Utah State Hospital. Following an examination at the Hospital, Dr. Roger
S. Kiger, M.D. and senior psychiatrist reported to Judge
Norseth that the appellant was competent to stand trial
(R. 11). No hearing need be held if the judge does not
think it expedient. Utah Code Ann. § 78-48-4 ( 1953). Evidently, there was no necessity for a hearing in this instance.

The examin.'.lt1011 l·epo1t
.sent to Mr. Coleman's attor.
ney, and the appellant callnot claim a denial of due process
on the basis that no c;anity hearmg was held.
Secondly, the appellant clai1 1s that he was denied due
prncess and equal protection of law because the trial court
refused to provL 1e him with a transcript of his trial. This
is a factual question and not a prnper (1uesticn to be raisecl
on appeal. In any event the appellant cannot claim prejudice even if no transcript was given to him personally. The
appellant is having his case appealed at tl1is time. A record
and transcript was prepared at Mr. Coleman's request (R.
1-3). The Supreme Court also appointed Mr. Gerald G.
Gundry to prepare a brief and argue Mr. Coleman's case
before the court. Obviously, appellant's second point is
1

without merit.
The appellant also claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The record indicates, however,
that Mr. Coleman was adequately represented throughout
every critical proceeding. A Notice of Appeal was timely
filed and appellant cannot claim prejudice. There has been
no showing of ineffective counsel, and this court has no
other alternative but to deny appellant's Point III of the
pro se brief.

CONCLUSION
The respondent asks this Court to affirm the judgment
of the trial court and hold that the trial judge did not commit reversihle error in giving Instruction No. 5.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent

